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·Jon Kelly

Does the West Want War?

The split over Iran exposes a harder question. What makes war look like the better option to some governments, even when their closest allies, their legislatures and their own publics disagree?

The split over Iran exposes a harder question. What makes war look like the better option to some governments, even when their closest allies, their legislatures and their own publics disagree?

EuroOilWatch · 16 November 2026 · OilWatch Network Analysis

On 26 February 2026, Oman's foreign minister, mediating in Geneva, reported "significant progress" in nuclear talks between the United States and Iran. Iran's foreign minister called the round the most intense yet. Technical talks were scheduled for the following week in Vienna.

Two days later, the United States and Israel attacked Iran.

Allies divided within hours. Spain condemned the strikes and refused to let the jointly operated bases at Rota and Morón be used for them; its defence minister said no assistance "of any kind, absolutely none" had been provided. Washington's response was not argument but coercion. "We're going to cut off all trade with Spain," the US president told reporters, adding that the US could use the bases anyway if it wished.

Britain took the middle road. Keir Starmer initially refused a US request to use British bases, then on 1 March agreed to a US request to use British bases for a "specific and limited defensive purpose", citing the "mistakes of Iraq". That night an Iranian-made drone struck RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus; London said it had been launched before the decision was announced. Britain insisted it was not at war. The president complained that it had taken "far too much time".

Three NATO members, one crisis, three choices. The question in the title is usually asked as if "the West" were a single actor with a single appetite. The Iran war shows it is not. The more useful question is narrower and more uncomfortable: under what conditions do particular Western governments choose war, and why do the checks that are supposed to stop them so often fail?

The assumptions, tested

The question this essay ends on asks what happens if a government's assumptions are wrong. For Iran, that question now has an answer.

The opening strikes killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The administration said it had projected a campaign of four to five weeks. Instead, Iran answered with missile and drone attacks across the region, and the conflict spread to at least nine countries. Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, and its new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, said that "the lever of blocking the Strait of Hormuz must continue to be used."

Brent crude, in the low $70s on the eve of the war, broke $100 on 9 March, briefly touching about $119 before talk of coordinated releases pulled it back; on 11 March the IEA agreed the largest emergency stock release in its history: 400 million barrels. It closed above $100 again on 12 March, the first such close since August 2022.

By early April, the US-based monitor HRANA had documented 3,636 deaths inside Iran, 1,701 of them civilians, including at least 254 children. In Lebanon, where Israel's parallel war with Hezbollah escalated, the health ministry's count had reached 3,798 by mid-June.

A ceasefire on 8 April nearly collapsed within a day when Iran re-closed the strait in response to Israeli strikes in Lebanon. A June framework collapsed too. US strikes resumed in July. The Congressional Budget Office put the Pentagon's direct costs at $38 billion through July. By September the Congressional Research Service was describing a war of attrition.

On 9 November, the president declared that "Iran militarily is effectively over" — while confirming that the US naval blockade of Iranian ports would continue, alongside a new task force to cut Iran's overland and Caspian trade. From 2 November, US forces carried out a series of limited strikes on Qeshm Island.

Nine months on, Iran's regime remains in place; the nuclear question is back on the table through Qatari mediators, though Tehran refuses formal talks until its conditions are met; and the strait that carried about a fifth of the world's oil supply is a bargaining chip rather than a shipping lane. The question Oman's mediation raised in February — how much time did Washington believe it had, and on what evidence? — was never answered publicly. The costs were.

Why some governments choose war

Governments can want things they believe war will deliver: removing a hostile government, stopping an adversary acquiring a weapon, convincing allies that their promises still carry weight. Washington presented a nuclear-capable Iran as an urgent threat. The case for striking depended on a further judgement: that military action would leave the region safer than giving negotiations more time.

That judgement is where Western wars most often go wrong. Not in the identification of a threat, which is frequently real, but in the confidence that force will resolve it faster and more cheaply than the alternatives — and in the habit of treating a deadline as a fact rather than a choice. The president had given Iran "10 to 15 days" nine days before the strikes. Talks were still producing movement when the strikes began, before the deadline had expired. A deadline that its author sets can always be extended by its author.

The record

The Western record is not a story of constant warmongering. It is a record of choices, some of which look different in hindsight than they did at the time.

Suez, 1956. Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt. The United States, their principal ally, opposed the operation and used financial pressure on sterling to force a withdrawal. Eden resigned within months. It is the closest precedent for February 2026, with the roles inverted: then, Washington restrained its European allies; now, European allies tried to restrain Washington and were threatened with trade embargoes for it.

Gulf of Tonkin, 1964. A reported second attack on US destroyers on 4 August became the basis for a congressional resolution passed 416–0 in the House and 88–2 in the Senate. The National Security Agency's own historian later concluded that the second attack almost certainly did not happen. The resolution became the legal foundation for a decade of war.

Kosovo, 1999. NATO bombed Yugoslavia for 78 days without UN Security Council authorisation. An independent international commission later called the intervention "illegal but legitimate". Supporters regard it as a case where force prevented atrocities; critics regard it as the precedent that taught Western governments the Security Council was optional.

Iraq, 2003. The United States and Britain invaded while France and Germany argued for continued weapons inspections. Britain's Iraq Inquiry later found that the UK chose to join the invasion before peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted.

Libya, 2011. Britain and France led an intervention presented as protecting civilians. A British parliamentary inquiry concluded that it drifted into regime change, with no adequate strategy for what followed.

Syria, 2013. The House of Commons voted down David Cameron's motion on military action, 285 to 272, and the government accepted the result. It remains the clearest modern example of a Western legislature stopping a war its executive wanted.

Venezuela, 2025–26. From September 2025, US forces began striking boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific that Washington said were carrying drugs; by late August 2026 the campaign had killed 223 people in 67 strikes, with little public evidence about who they were. On 3 January 2026, US forces struck targets across Venezuela and seized President Nicolás Maduro. Congress had not authorised military force; the administration argued there was no war against the state of Venezuela, and the president said the US would "run" the country.

The pattern across these cases is consistent. The wars that look worst in retrospect were launched on compressed timelines, on contested evidence, with alternatives still available and with legislatures either bypassed or rushed. The refusals — Syria in 2013, Spain in 2026 — were made where a deliberative body or a government willing to absorb an ally's anger slowed the decision down.

The new vocabulary of war

Something else has changed in the past year: the way Western leaders talk.

In September 2025, Germany's chancellor Friedrich Merz told business leaders, "We are not at war, but we are also no longer living in peace," citing drone overflights, sabotage, espionage and cyberattacks. The same month, Russian drones entered Polish airspace during an attack on Ukraine; Polish and Dutch jets shot several down — the first time a NATO member had fired during the war — and Poland invoked Article 4. Denmark weighed doing the same after drones closed its airports, then decided against it.

The rhetoric escalated from there:

  • France, November 2025. The chief of the defence staff, General Fabien Mandon, told the Congress of Mayors that France had to be ready to « accepter de perdre ses enfants » ("accept losing its children"), referring to young adults who had chosen to serve in the armed forces, and to suffer economically, citing the prioritising of defence production as an example. He warned of a possible confrontation with Russia within three or four years. The reaction ran across the political spectrum, from Mélenchon on the left to the Rassemblement National on the right. The armed forces minister backed him.
  • NATO, December 2025. Secretary General Mark Rutte, speaking in Berlin, told Europeans they must be prepared for "the scale of war our grandparents or great-grandparents endured", and that Russia could be ready to use force against NATO within five years.
  • Britain, December 2025. Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, the chief of the defence staff, used his first RUSI lecture to say that Britain's "sons and daughters" must be ready to fight, and that more families would come to know what sacrifice for the nation means. He added, of his French counterpart: "Fabien Mandon was right."
  • Germany, December 2025. The Bundestag passed a new military service law, 323 to 272, making a service questionnaire compulsory for young men from 2026 and medical examinations compulsory from July 2027, with provision for needs-based conscription if volunteer numbers fall short and the Bundestag votes to trigger it.
  • United States, September 2025. The Department of Defense was given the secondary title Department of War. Pete Hegseth promised "maximum lethality, not tepid legality", and told assembled generals that the department's only mission was war fighting.

Is this hysteria? The honest answer is that it depends on which claim you test.

The case for the warnings is not trivial. Russia's military spending reached an estimated 7.5% of GDP in 2025. The drone incursions, sabotage and cyberattacks Merz listed are documented. Rutte explicitly framed his speech as an argument for spending that would make war less likely, not more. Deterrence requires that an adversary believe you will fight, and that belief has to be manufactured partly through public preparation.

The case against is about framing rather than facts. A threat assessment with a date attached — "by 2030", "within five years", "in three or four years" — has a way of becoming a planning assumption, then a budget line, then a self-fulfilling expectation on both sides. When a general tells mayors that the country must be ready to lose its children, the message is not only to Moscow. It is a request for consent, made in advance, for a war whose terms no one has yet described. That is exactly what this essay's verdict warns against: a choice presented as an inevitability.

There is also a geographic oddity that the rhetoric obscures. Europe's war talk is about Russia. The war the West actually started in 2026 was against Iran, launched by the one ally that most European governments did not want to follow. And the most explicit threat of force against a NATO member that winter came not from Moscow but from Washington, when the president declined to rule out taking Greenland from Denmark and Danish and allied troops deployed to the island in response. At Davos on 21 January he ruled out using force, while still pressing to acquire the island. But for a month, an alliance built to deter one adversary found itself hedging against its own leader.

Who benefits

There are interests that profit when governments spend more on arms. SIPRI puts arms revenues for the world's 100 largest arms and military services companies at $679 billion in 2024, including $334 billion for the 39 US firms on the list. World military expenditure reached a record $2.887 trillion in 2025, the eleventh consecutive annual rise. Europe's spending grew 14% to $864 billion; in Central and Western Europe it was the sharpest annual rise since the end of the Cold War. US spending dipped in 2025, but Congress has approved over $1 trillion for 2026, and SIPRI says it could reach $1.5 trillion in 2027.

None of this proves why any particular government goes to war. Establishing that takes evidence about the decision itself, and arms firms profit from rearmament whether or not the weapons are ever used. But the structure matters even without a conspiracy. The benefits of military spending are concentrated: a contract has an announced value, a constituency and a place on a map. The costs of war are diffuse: they land in thousands of places at once, starting with the people whose homes, hospitals and livelihoods are destroyed, and spreading outward through fuel bills and food prices to people who were never asked. Concentrated interests organise. Diffuse costs do not. That asymmetry tilts every budget debate, every procurement decision and every escalation ladder in the same direction.

Who decides

If "the West" means its publics, the evidence suggests it did not want this war.

By June, a Reuters/Ipsos poll found that only 24% of Americans believed the Iran war had been worth its costs. In late July, AP-NORC found 64% said the war had not been worth fighting, including about 37% of Republicans. After the November midterms, seven in ten Americans told Reuters/Ipsos they wanted the new Congress to end it.

Congress pushed back harder than at any point in the war. In June both chambers adopted a concurrent war powers resolution directing the president to end hostilities against Iran: the House on 3 June, the Senate on 23 June. As a concurrent resolution it never went to the president, who called the House vote "unpatriotic" and "meaningless"; the White House said it had no force of law. The war continued.

In Europe, the pattern was similar. Spain's government refused and survived the threat of an embargo; Germany's chancellor told Washington privately that the EU negotiates trade as a bloc and Spain could not be singled out. France's president called Sánchez to express solidarity. Britain's government accepted a limited role and spent the following months insisting it was not a participant.

The lesson is not that democracies are powerless. It is that the decision to start a war and the decision to stop one are not symmetrical. An executive can launch strikes in a night. Legislatures, courts and electorates work on timescales of weeks, months and election cycles — by which point the war has generated its own logic, its own casualties to avenge and its own sunk costs to justify.

Why preparing to fight can still help prevent war

None of this is an argument for disarmament. A government has a duty to make an attack on its own people less likely, and NATO's collective defence commitment is designed to make any attacker reckon with the response of an alliance. There is a serious case for giving that promise military weight, especially when a neighbouring power is fighting a war of conquest and testing allied airspace with drones.

The risk is the security dilemma: each side reads the other's preparations as evidence of intent and builds up in response. That makes diplomacy, transparency and clearly limited military objectives part of a credible defence policy rather than an alternative to it. Deterrence that is described in the language of inevitability is not deterrence. It is preparation for the thing it claims to prevent.

The verdict

Does the West want war? Its publics, on the evidence of 2026, mostly do not. Its legislatures, when given the chance, have voted against wars more often than its executives would like. Some of its governments do choose war — and when they do, they increasingly bypass the institutions designed to slow them down, describe the choice as forced on them, and treat allies who decline to join as adversaries.

Before any government asks its public to accept a war, it should be able to answer three questions in public:

  1. What do you expect force to achieve, and by when? For Iran in 2026, the implied answer was a short campaign that would end the nuclear threat. Nine months later, the regime remains, proposals are moving through Qatar and the blockade continues.
  2. Which diplomatic options have you tried, and why were they exhausted? Oman reported significant progress two days before the strikes. No public account has explained why that track was abandoned.
  3. What happens if your assumptions are wrong? Hormuz closed. Oil hit $119. Thousands died in Iran and Lebanon. A NATO ally was threatened with an embargo for refusing to take part. A British base was struck the night Britain agreed to a limited role.

That third question belongs in the debate before the first strike. By the time the answer arrives, the people who had the least say are usually the ones already paying the highest price.


Sources

Iran war: diplomacy, outbreak and allied responses

Iran war: course, costs and casualties

Congress and public opinion

Venezuela and Greenland

European and US war rhetoric

Military spending

Historical cases


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