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Global Oil Supply Routes

Status of the key maritime chokepoints and supply routes that affect European fuel security. The transit, port-flow and sea-state panels below refresh daily from satellite-AIS and weather feeds; the chokepoint risk assessments further down are maintained editorially.

→ Strait of Hormuz crisis timeline — a sourced, filterable chronology of the 2026 crisis.

Live Global AIS — Shipping & Tanker Traffic

Map: VesselFinder →

Illustrative, not a count. Live positions of vessels broadcasting AIS worldwide — pan and zoom to any region or chokepoint. Ships running dark (AIS off) or affected by GPS spoofing do not appear, so this is a live picture, not a measure of traffic. For chokepoint transit counts — the authoritative figures — see the Hormuz throughput and IMF PortWatch panels below. Map data © VesselFinder.

Global Supply Chokepoints — Risk Overview

World map showing maritime supply chokepoints affecting UK and European fuel security
Risk:NormalElevatedHighCritical

21 August 2026 — Two assessments corrected; a corridor claim is not a verified flow

This note was last updated 8 days ago and may be behind the current situation.

Two chokepoint entries below were corrected today. The Scarborough Shoal entry previously described an established blockade; that wording has been withdrawn as unverified — the observed state is active gray-zone coercion (coast guard presence, water cannon, blocking operations, joint drills), with no declared blockade and no verified exchange of fire, and no new incident verified since the 1 August drills. The Danish Straits entry has been re-baselined from “normal — monitoring” to elevated: the route is open and functioning, but Danish enforcement keeps tightening — Skagen anchorage inspections and Great Belt sulphur monitoring were added this month — and navigation-safety risk is rising. Both entries now align with the network’s 11 August reassessment.

On Hormuz, unnamed US officials claimed (Axios, 19 August) a southern corridor along Oman moving 15–20 tankers a night with outbound flows approaching 10 mb/d. Those are attributed claims without cargo-level verification. The cross-check: Kpler observed seven commodity ships transiting on 20 August — four in, three out, none a VLCC or LNG carrier — figures that exclude AIS-dark traffic. Against the near-standstill recorded in the note below, seven visible ships is a recovery from two — and still a rounding error against pre-war traffic above 130 a day.

Status, stated plainly. Hormuz: NOT reopened; visible transits remain in single digits. Brent was near $93.44 and WTI near $86.76 on Thursday morning (Reuters), up from $88.52 at Friday’s close — direction and mechanism still aligned. Next review triggers: cargo-verified corridor volumes, a sustained return to double-digit daily visible transits, or a verified new attack on shipping or export infrastructure.

15 August 2026 — Hormuz reaches a near-standstill, and no crude was visible

This note was last updated 8 days ago and may be behind the current situation.

Kpler observed two vessel crossings of the Strait on Friday 14 August, against nine on Thursday and five on Wednesday, with an August daily average of about 12 — set against pre-war traffic above 130 vessels a day. On Friday, no crude-oil shipments were visible at all.

Read that precisely. AIS-dark crossings remain possible, so zero visible crude is not the same as zero physical crude. This is an observation of what can be seen, not a census of what moved — and it is a different measure again from the IMF PortWatch tanker series shown elsewhere on this page, which counts a different vessel population against its own 2023 baseline. The two are not interchangeable and should not be spliced.

The security picture deteriorated alongside it. Two ADNOC vessels were attacked on Thursday and a third on Friday — three ADNOC incidents in under a week — while UKMTO separately reported a bulk carrier struck by an unidentified projectile on Friday, its crew reported safe. Iran maintains that passage remains subject to its permission, and peace negotiations remain halted.

What changed. The week to 9 August gave a percentage — an 18% fall in total transits. This gives absolute daily counts, and they describe a near-standstill rather than a depressed plateau. Brent settled $88.52 on Friday, up about 6% on the week. The physical mechanism and the price are moving in the same direction for once — which is not how most of this crisis has read.

9 August 2026 — Hormuz talks advance — just as the Red Sea workaround is hit again

This note was last updated 20 days ago and may be behind the current situation.

Two things moved today and they point in opposite directions. On Hormuz, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said the Iran–Oman shipping-lane agreement is in its final stages — but also that it would not by itself reopen the Strait, saying reopening depends on further US actions including compensation for attacks on Iran. Separately the IRGC said the Strait reopens when Washington accepts Iran’s conditions, and Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, secretary of Iran’s top national-security body, listed broader demands including lifting sanctions and the blockade and ending attacks on Iran and its regional allies. Three speakers, three different claims — reported separately rather than merged into one Iranian position.

Meanwhile the route around Hormuz was attacked. The Houthis said they struck Saudi Aramco’s 400,000 b/d Jazan refinery on the Red Sea coast with a drone, spokesman Yahya Saree calling the strike precise and framing it as a response to Saudi drone incursions over Saada and Hajjah. Saudi Arabia’s energy ministry confirmed a fire at the facility, said it was extinguished and reported no injuries — without stating a cause. The claim and the confirmation come from different parties; only the fire is officially established. The refinery had already been shut after the late-July attack.

Why the pairing matters more than either item alone. Jazan sits on the Red Sea side of Saudi Arabia’s workaround to Hormuz — the corridor that lets Aramco move refined product without transiting the strait. One chokepoint is negotiating a route back toward normal while the alternative corridor becomes less secure. That is what the market has to price, and Brent’s $83.55 close on Friday (+1.3%, Reuters) reflects a market still waiting for clarity rather than one that has resolved anything.

Status, stated plainly. Hormuz reopening: NOT AGREED. Iran–Oman shipping lanes: final stages, per Araqchi. Reopening conditions: unresolved. A lane design describes where ships would go if the strait reopened — not whether it will. Any headline reading “deal close” as “reopening imminent” is a misreading of what was actually said today.

8 August 2026 — Iran and Oman agree a route; eight vessels crossed

This note was last updated 21 days ago and may be behind the current situation.

The negotiating pause below has produced something concrete. Iran says it has reached agreement with Oman on a proposed shipping route through Hormuz, with a joint statement in final drafting (Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei, 5 August, via Bloomberg). The reported framework routes inbound vessels near the Iranian side and outbound vessels down the Omani side, imposes no transit or service fees, and may include regional participation in demining; Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi told IRNA it is a temporary route intended to run two to four months. Fortune reports (7 August) that the emerging deal recognises Iran’s control of the waterway. NPR called a partial reopening “close” on 6 August.

An agreed route is not a reopened strait. Kpler counted eight vessels crossing on 5 August — five tankers and three bulk carriers — against more than 100 a day before the conflict. That is the same order of magnitude as the single-digit weekends recorded on 27 July, so on the only metric that measures actual movement, nothing has yet changed. A return to normal tanker, LNG and container flows plausibly requires several consecutive weeks of incident-free transits, published routing protocols, credible mine clearance and a stable US–Iran political agreement — none of which is in place.

Futures have traded the negotiation rather than the flow: Brent hit a three-week low of $79.36 on 4 August, settled $79.45 on 5 August, then recovered to $83.55 on 7 August (+$1.06, +1.3%) as the terms of who would control the strait came back into doubt (Reuters). Friday’s settlement is the latest available; 8 August is a Saturday.

Provenance, so nothing is rolled forward silently. Two figures in the 2 August note below have not been refreshed and should not be read as current: the ~25 Bab el-Mandeb crossings, which was already a floor rather than a count because vessels run dark, and the Kirkuk–Ceyhan ~170–180,000 b/d flow against 750,000 b/d of reserved capacity. Both are dated 2 August and stand as of that date only. Note also that vessel counts and barrel-per-day flow estimates are different metrics measured by different methods — they are not interchangeable, and a recovery in one does not evidence a recovery in the other.

2 August 2026 — Negotiating pause at Hormuz; the water stays dangerous; Kirkuk–Ceyhan extended

President Trump says the planned strikes on Iranian energy targets are cancelled or postponed while Gulf governments try to complete a deal covering Iran’s nuclear programme and the “immediate, complete and total” reopening of Hormuz; Israel is said to have joined, Iran has not publicly accepted, and no verified reporting shows normal traffic resuming. The weekend produced two tanker incidents regardless: a vessel disabled by an unknown projectile off Limah (engine room hit, “not under command”), and a reported explosion close alongside a second tanker ~21nm north-west of Khasab — both unattributed. Hormuz is permitting, or failing to prevent, individual passages; Bab el-Mandeb improved to ~25 crossings but every count is a minimum with ships running dark; SUMED loadings have surged (Sidi Kerir 28.79M bbl for July, per Kpler via Reuters) even as a drone struck gas vessels at Damietta, and CPC has suspended loadings twice in a week. One durable positive: Turkey and Iraq extended the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline deal by a year — reserved capacity up to 750,000 b/d against ~170–180,000 flowing, a Mediterranean outlet for Iraqi crude that needs no strait transit, secured on conditions. A pause in the shooting is not a reopening of the sea.

27 July 2026 — The shooting has paused; the shipping crisis has not

Financial markets are pricing a pause; the physical system is not. Brent fell more than 6% on Monday to about $90.58 a barrel (WTI ~$83.51) after the US and Iran refrained from striking each other for a second consecutive day, with Oman and other intermediaries working to restore the interim ceasefire framework and negotiate Hormuz shipping arrangements — roughly $11 of war premium out since Brent reached about $102 on 23 July. But traffic through both chokepoints stayed severely depressed. Hormuz ran in single digits over the weekend — about seven commodity vessels Friday, three Saturday (all dark) and seven Sunday (Kpler) — so the strait has not meaningfully reopened. Bab el-Mandeb fell to just 11 crossings on Sunday (seven of them oil tankers), the lowest in months, after the Houthi strikes on Jizan and Yanbu, though several large VLCCs carrying Saudi, Emirati and Russian crude still escaped south toward Asia. Physical crude cargoes reached two-month highs last week and roughly 10 mb/d of Middle Eastern barrels may still be displaced. The signal has changed; the supply system has barely changed — market de-escalation without physical normalisation, with the US naval blockade still operating and the nuclear dispute unresolved.

21 July 2026 — Ceasefire collapses again; Houthis declare an embargo on all ships to Saudi ports

The interim 17 June truce has broken down and US strikes have run a tenth consecutive night (CENTCOM), with Iran striking a Kuwaiti power and desalination plant. The Red Sea threat is now concrete: in an email to shipowners seen by Bloomberg, Yemen’s Houthis warned their reimposed blockade covers all ships calling at Saudi ports — not just Saudi-flagged vessels — directly threatening Yanbu, the Red Sea outlet Saudi Arabia uses to bypass Hormuz. Enforcement is unproven, and a Saudi-led coalition says it has begun protective measures at Bab el-Mandeb. Hormuz itself runs at a near-halt — about four commodity vessels crossed Monday (Kpler), every one dark. Brent touched $91.42 Monday, its highest since 11 June, before easing to about $89 on hopes of a fresh ceasefire, while European low-sulphur gasoil hit a record premium near $60/bbl over Brent. The dated detail below remains the fuller background.

13–14 July 2026 — Both powers claim Hormuz: Iran declares it closed; the US drops its 20% toll but tightens a full Iran blockade

The US–Iran conflict has escalated sharply since the July ceasefire collapsed. Over the weekend Iran’s IRGC declared the Strait of Hormuz closed “until further notice” — after its forces struck the Cyprus-flagged container ship GFS Galaxy (engine-room fire, crew evacuated to a lifeboat, one crew member missing; CENTCOM). The US answered with further rounds of strikes, the latest on Sunday using one-way attack sea drones for the first time, and Iran retaliated across Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman — including the first strike on Gulf oil infrastructure in weeks, a Kuwaiti drilling facility. Oil jumped at Monday’s open, Brent trading above $79 and WTI near $74; by Tuesday Brent had pushed above $85, a four-week high, as the war premium returned in force.

On Monday the US hardened its claim over the strait: in a Truth Social post President Trump declared Hormuz “OPEN… with or without Iran,” reinstated a US blockade of Iranian ships and customers, styled the United States the “Guardian of the Hormuz Strait,” and proposed a 20% fee on all cargo transiting the waterway, the process to “begin immediately.” Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority countered that passage was “currently unfeasible” and suspended transit permits. Both powers now assert a right to control — and charge for — the chokepoint, days after the IMO Council ruled that transit through international straits may not be tolled. On Tuesday, after backlash from shippers and the IMO ruling, Trump abandoned the 20% fee — replacing it with a push for Gulf trade and investment deals — while keeping a full blockade on Iran-linked shipping (vessels to or from Iranian ports, or carrying Iranian cargo), which CENTCOM began enforcing that afternoon.

Iranian officials say a US projectile hit the perimeter area of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, and Reuters has carried the perimeter claim — but there is no independent confirmation that the reactor itself was hit. Earlier IAEA and Reuters reporting on previous Bushehr incidents found no reactor damage or radiological release; no fresh IAEA confirmation has yet been seen for this latest strike.

Reuters ship-tracking found at least four oil and gas tankers reversed course near the strait; others continued to transit. The strait’s status is now openly contested — Iran declares it closed while the US and CENTCOM insist it stays open to lawful transit, and the JMIC says the Oman-coordinated southern lane remains available. The US Navy-led Joint Maritime Information Center has raised the transit threat to “severe” — up from “substantial,” its highest since mid-June — and the IMO Secretary-General has urged shipowners not to expose crews to unnecessary danger by transiting while safety cannot be assured. Brent spiked about 6% to near $80 as the fighting resumed, round-tripped to about $76 by Friday, then jumped back above $79 at Monday’s open and above $85 by Tuesday.

A fresh JMIC advisory (013-26, 10 July) keeps the threat level at “severe” but stresses the strait stays open: the southern transit route has been expanded and remains available to all traffic, coordination with NAVCENT’s NCAGS is offered but not mandatory, and — pointedly — “there is no controlling authority regulating passage or fee required for any route.” US NAVCENT added that “no nation has the authority to close or control the Strait of Hormuz,” with US forces prepared to defend freedom of navigation. Mariners are warned of a mine-danger area in the traditional traffic-separation scheme and to expect VHF hailing from naval forces.

War-risk insurance underlines the caution. Marsh, the world’s largest marine broker, says premiums to transit Hormuz now run 2–6% of a vessel’s value — up from a fraction of a percent before the war, having peaked near 10% at the height of the fighting (large no-claim discounts often trim the headline rate). Brokers report fewer requests for quotes since the ceasefire frayed this week, though cover remains available (Bloomberg, 9 Jul). The Lloyd’s Joint War Committee has listed the whole Gulf as high-risk since March — a listing that adds cost and a notification duty but does not bar transit.

On a second front, Ukraine’s drone campaign in the Sea of Azov has escalated sharply. Its Unmanned Systems Forces say they have struck Russian shadow-fleet shipping — the tankers that move sanctioned oil and products — across a nine-day operation, with Kyiv now putting the total at 116 vessels(an unverified claim; ~76, including 21 tankers, was the earlier multi-sourced count). In response Russia suspended shipping through the Kerch Strait and the Don–Azov Canal (FSB Border Service, from 10 July) and says it may divert to Black Sea and Baltic ports — a self-imposed chokepoint closure that cut Azov AIS traffic roughly55% (Starboard Maritime). With up to a quarter of Russian wheat exports transiting the Azov, Euronext wheat jumped about 4% to a six-week high. The IMO Secretary-General condemned the Azov and Black Sea attacks, warning the focus on Hormuz should not overshadow threats elsewhere; Russia’s Lavrov called them “terrorism,” while Kyiv says it strikes only military or war-supporting assets. Neither side’s figures are independently verified (Reuters, TWZ, gCaptain).

Sources: Reuters, WSJ, Bloomberg, JMIC 013-26, NAVCENT/NCAGS, Lloyd’s JWC, IMO, CENTCOM, UKMTO. Available footage and Tier-1 reporting attribute the “cancer” remark to Iran’s government and leadership — not the Iranian people, and not a call for their eradication.

Strait of Hormuz — Tanker Throughput

vs 2023 baseline

Vessel count · primary measure

4%of 2023 baseline

▼ down from ~26% peak (2026-07-07)

2026-05-262026-08-23

Transits

2/day

4% of 2023

Cargo

~0.2 mb/d

derived ×7.33

Capacity

1%

secondary · mix-sensitive

Tanker movements through Hormuz collapsed to zero at the height of the conflict, recovered to about 26% of the 2023 count baseline by 2026-07-07, and have since fallen back to about 4% in the seven days to 2026-08-23. PortWatch observed 17 tankers across that week; the 2023 average was 55.5/day.

Count is the headline because capacity is sensitive to vessel mix — at these volumes one large tanker can dominate a week's tonnage without a comparable change in the number of movements. Both figures are measured against PortWatch's own 2023 baseline for the same field.

Note: PortWatch publishes with a lag. This series ends 2026-08-23, 6 days before the last data refresh — so it describes the week to 2026-08-23, not today. Events since that date are not in these figures.

Read it as a floor. This is an AIS-based count, and a meaningful share of post-conflict Hormuz traffic runs with transponders off (dark transit) or via evasive routing — so true movement is likely higher than the figure shown.

Aggregate strait transits (all tankers, all origins) — not by-country loadings or empty-tanker inflows, which require paid vessel intelligence. mb/d derived from cargo tonnage at 7.33 bbl/tonne.

Source: IMF PortWatch · satellite-AIS chokepoint transits · latest 2026-08-23

Strait of Hormuz — Force Posture

Operation Epic Fury · reported, not live positions

US / Coalition

  • Carrier strike groupsconfirmed

    The U.S. briefly surged three aircraft carriers into the Middle East in April — Ford, Lincoln and George H.W. Bush — per CENTCOM-cited reporting at the time (the first three-carrier presence there since 2003). By July, open-source fleet trackers and Navy releases point to a two-carrier posture in the Arabian Sea, centred on USS Abraham Lincoln and USS George H.W. Bush, with amphibious big-deck ships (Tripoli, Boxer) also in the region. USS Gerald R. Ford returned to Norfolk on 16 May after an 11-month deployment and is not part of the July posture.

    USNI Fleet & Marine Tracker (7 Jul) · Navy releases (11 Jul) · Breaking Defense (Apr) · AP (Ford return) · confirmed 11 Jul

  • Freedom-of-navigation postureconfirmed

    CENTCOM states the strait is open to lawful transit and its forces are positioned to ensure it (“Iran does not control the strait. Traffic is flowing.”). After thirteen consecutive nights of strikes on Iranian coastal military targets, US strikes paused from 25 July and had held for a second consecutive day by the 27th while Oman-brokered diplomacy proceeds; the US naval blockade of Iran-linked shipping remains in force. “Open,” though, has not meant “normal” — Hormuz traffic is still running at single digits a day.

    CENTCOM / Washington Times · confirmed 27 Jul

  • Mine countermeasuresconfirmed

    US naval mine-clearance missions reported in the strait; President Trump has instructed the Navy to fire on Iranian vessels caught laying mines.

    CENTCOM reporting · confirmed 12 Jul

Iran (IRGC Navy / IRIN)

  • Fast-attack craft (swarm)assessed

    Large inventory of small fast-attack craft (Zolfaghar- and Peykaap-class) built for asymmetric hit-and-run swarm tactics — speed, dispersion and saturation to surround a vessel; armed with heavy machine guns, rockets and short-range anti-ship missiles.

    IISS / CNN ‘mosquito fleet’ · confirmed 8 May

  • Coastal anti-ship missilesassessed

    Coastal ASCM batteries and craft-mounted missiles — e.g. the short-range Nasr-1 and the Zafar (≈250 km, subsonic, INS/GPS) — designed to salvo against merchant and naval vessels transiting the strait.

    Strauss Center / US ONI · confirmed 15 May

  • Naval minesassessed

    Substantial sea-mine inventory — the classic Hormuz-closure tool and the trigger for the US mine-clearance operations now under way.

    Strauss Center · confirmed 12 Jul

  • Submarines & recent activityassessed

    IRGC Navy has put submarines and fast boats into the strait (Maritime Security Belt 2026 exercise) and has attacked commercial vessels with fast-attack craft in recent weeks.

    Army Recognition / reporting · confirmed 11 Jul

  • Key basesassessed

    Bandar Abbas (principal IRGCN/IRIN base) and Jask, plus dispersed coastal sites along the northern shore of the strait.

    Strauss Center · confirmed 1 Jun

Recent incidents · from the crisis timeline

Full chronology: Strait of Hormuz crisis timeline →

Reported open-source posture — approximate, drawn from public agency statements, wire reporting and reference works, NOT live tactical positions. Exact locations and counts are not publicly confirmed and change constantly. 'Confirmed' = stated in official/agency reporting; 'Assessed' = analyst or reference estimate (e.g. IISS, ONI, CSIS).

This posture snapshot was last updated 33 days ago and may be behind the current situation.

Chokepoint Transit Monitor

Tanker tonnage (DWT) vs 2023 baseline · IMF PortWatch (AIS estimates)
Oil Route StressSevere

Strait of Hormuz tanker tonnage is at 1% of normal, with Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Suez Canal also restricted.

Crude- and product-carrying capacity actually moving through each chokepoint — weighted by tanker size (a VLCC isn’t a coastal product tanker).

Strait of HormuzAIS low
2.4/day tankers · 5/day all vessels
1%
severely restricted
Bab el-Mandeb StraitAIS low
9.7/day tankers · 29.4/day all vessels
27%
depressed
Suez Canal
16.4/day tankers · 42/day all vessels
47%
depressed
Bosporus Strait
19.6/day tankers · 69/day all vessels
73%
near normal
Panama Canal
12.4/day tankers · 26.7/day all vessels
90%
near normal
Cape of Good Hope
20.1/day tankers · 91.6/day all vessels
129%
elevated (diversion)

Latest data 2026-08-23 (≈6 days ago) — PortWatch reports in arrears, so it confirms shifts after the fact, not in real time. The % is tanker capacity (DWT) vs the 2023 daily average (trailing 7-day); ship counts shown for context. Lanes marked AIS low are conflict zones where spoofing, jamming or vessels going dark mean these figures are a floor — a significant share of Hormuz traffic runs with transponders off, so true movement is likely higher. Source: IMF PortWatch — estimated from satellite AIS, not customs data. PortWatch does not tell us the exact barrel, grade or buyer — only whether the ships needed to move the oil economy are actually moving.

Port Oil-Flow Monitor

Tanker import/export vs 2023 baseline · IMF PortWatch (AIS estimates)

Crude and product moving through major hubs — daily tanker tonnage in (↓) and out (↑), with how it compares to the 2023 average. Where the barrels are actually going.

Europe, Med & Baltic

🇳🇱
Rotterdam
401 in · ↑ 103 out kt/d · net import
91%
near 2023
🇷🇺
Novorossiysk
0 in · ↑ 173 out kt/d · net export
136%
above 2023
🇧🇪
Antwerp
81 in · ↑ 72 out kt/d · balanced
69%
below 2023
🇷🇺
Primorsk
0 in · ↑ 116 out kt/d · net export
71%
below 2023
🇵🇱
Gdansk
103 in · ↑ 4 out kt/d · net import
106%
near 2023
🇮🇹
Trieste
96 in · ↑ 0 out kt/d · net import
105%
near 2023
🇪🇸
Algeciras
42 in · ↑ 35 out kt/d · balanced
85%
below 2023
🇮🇹
Augusta
49 in · ↑ 18 out kt/d · net import
109%
near 2023
🇵🇹
Sines
53 in · ↑ 8 out kt/d · net import
118%
near 2023
🇬🇷
Piraeus
3 in · ↑ 4 out kt/d · balanced
106%
near 2023

Global oil hubs

🇺🇸
Houston
74 in · ↑ 445 out kt/d · net export
120%
near 2023
🇦🇪
Fujairah
52 in · ↑ 88 out kt/d · net export
65%
below 2023

Latest data 2026-08-21 (PortWatch reports ~a week in arrears — it confirms shifts after the fact, not in real time). Volumes in thousand tonnes/day (kt/d), trailing 7-day average vs 2023. Source: IMF PortWatch — tanker tonnage estimated from satellite AIS, not customs data; some terminals (e.g. Gulf export ports) are under-covered and read low.

Europe Replacement Barrel Tracker

Tanker tonnage vs 2023 · IMF PortWatch (AIS estimates)

Where Europe is taking crude and product by sea — total tanker tonnage arriving and leaving, against the 2023 norm. A read on whether Europe is sourcing enough volume, not which barrels.

Tanker imports
828 kt/d
96% of 2023
Tanker exports
532 kt/d
88% of 2023
Net balance
net import
296 kt/d

By region

Northwest Europe
482 in · ↑ 175 out kt/d
89%
imports vs 2023
Baltic & North Sea
103 in · ↑ 120 out kt/d
107%
imports vs 2023
Mediterranean
243 in · ↑ 64 out kt/d
111%
imports vs 2023
Black Sea
0 in · ↑ 173 out kt/d
5%
imports vs 2023

Latest data 2026-08-21. Trailing 7-day tanker tonnage vs the 2023 daily average. Source: IMF PortWatch — AIS estimates. PortWatch gives no origin or grade, so this shows where tankers are arriving, not confirmed replacement of specific Middle East barrels.

Where Europe's crude comes from

EU-27 crude oil imports by origin · Eurostat

Which barrels actually feed Europe, by supplier country. Drag the year slider to watch Russia's share collapse after the Dec-2022 seaborne ban and Feb-2023 products embargo, with the US, Norway and Kazakhstan filling the gap.

2024
United StatesNorwayKazakhstanSaudi ArabiaLibyaIraqNigeriaBrazilUnited KingdomAzerbaijanOtherEU-279.46 mb/d
19902024

Top suppliers · 2024

United States1.4115%
Norway1.3214%
Kazakhstan1.0511%
Saudi Arabia0.707%
Libya0.697%
Iraq0.576%
Nigeria0.526%
Brazil0.435%
United Kingdom0.414%
Azerbaijan0.394%
Other1.9621%

Source: Eurostat — NRG_TI_OIL (crude oil, reporter EU27_2020), retrieved 2026-08-29. Spine is volume (Mt); mb/d is derived as Mt × 7.33 ÷ 365. “Other” is computed (EU total minus the listed partners).

Tanker Activity at Key Chokepoints

Preliminary · baseline building

ARA Approaches

70tankers

unique transits, last 24h

Rotterdam · Antwerp · Amsterdam

Europe's main refined-product corridor — Loop 3 leading indicator

Suez / Bab-el-Mandeb

0tankers

unique transits, last 24h

Pre-Houthi: ~80 transits/day combined

Red Sea corridor — Cape rerouting pressure

Live AIS tanker tracking via aisstream.io, captured every 4 hours and aggregated into rolling 24-hour, 7-day, and 28-day counts. Baseline accumulating since 20 May 2026. Updated 28 Aug, 19:56. Terrestrial AIS covers the North Sea and Mediterranean approaches well; the Persian Gulf is not covered here, so Strait of Hormuz throughput is shown from satellite-AIS data (IMF PortWatch) in the panels above rather than counted here.

Live Sea State — Oil Shipping Chokepoints

Significant wave height, wave period, and 10-metre wind speed. Updated 29 Aug, 01:09 UTC.

CalmModerateRoughDangerous

Strait of Hormuz

Persian Gulf / Gulf of Oman

Calm

0.20m

wave height

4.3s

period

2kt · g3NNE

wind

Bab el-Mandeb

Red Sea / Gulf of Aden

Calm

0.36m

wave height

5.3s

period

5kt · g7SSE

wind

Suez Approaches (Port Said)

Eastern Mediterranean

Calm

0.22m

wave height

4.4s

period

8kt · g13WSW

wind

English Channel (Dover Strait)

NW Europe

Rough

1.98m

wave height

5.3s

period

24kt · g33SW

wind

Skagerrak

North Sea / Baltic

Moderate

0.74m

wave height

3.9s

period

13kt · g16SSW

wind

Source: Open-Meteo Marine + Forecast APIs (sourced from European met agencies). Risk band uses Douglas-style sea-state (wave height) and Beaufort-style wind thresholds; whichever is worse sets the band. open-meteo.com ↗

War-Risk Watch

Editorial · updated weekly

JWC Listed Areas — high risk

Strait of HormuzPersian / Arabian GulfGulf of OmanGulf of AdenIndian Ocean (Somali HRA)Southern Red Sea / Bab-el-MandebBlack SeaSea of AzovGulf of GuineaLibyan watersYemeni waters

Latest list change (2026-03-03): JWC circular JWLA-033 (3 March 2026) added Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar to listed areas and amended the broader Persian/Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Southern Red Sea zone. No areas have been removed since.

Premium readings (publicly cited)

  • Persian / Mideast Gulf transitw/w broadly stable
    around 1% of hull value per voyage
    S&P Global Commodity Insights; Marsh McLennan; Reuters (Mar–Jun 2026)
  • Strait of Hormuz — voyage-specificw/w voyage-dependent
    higher and volatile; quoted as high as ~3% during peak March tension, ~0.8% on successful transits after no-claims adjustments
    Reuters (March 2026); S&P Global
  • Sea of Azov / Kerch Straitw/w sharply higher
    route effectively shut — Russia suspended Kerch Strait & Don–Azov Canal transit (from 10 Jul) after a nine-day Ukrainian drone campaign against the shadow fleet; Kyiv claims 116 vessels hit (~76 multi-sourced, incl. 21 tankers), Azov AIS traffic down ~55%
    Reuters, TWZ, gCaptain, Starboard Maritime (Jul 2026)

Current reading: Cover is still being written in the London market — the Lloyd's Market Association reports war-risk insurance remains available — but terms have hardened and pricing now turns voyage by voyage as the US–Iran war intensifies around Hormuz. Both Washington and Tehran now claim to control the strait: Iran demands permits and has called passage 'currently unfeasible,' while President Trump has floated a 20% US toll on all Hormuz cargo (the IMO Council has ruled transit through international straits may not be tolled, and no US collection mechanism exists yet). Brent has jumped above $85, transits have thinned to a five-week low, and AIS-dark crossings are rising. A second, self-inflicted chokepoint has opened in the north: after Ukrainian drones struck ~76 Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov (including 21 tankers of the sanctioned shadow fleet), Russia suspended the Kerch Strait and Don–Azov Canal — hull risk on Black Sea/Azov shadow-fleet tankers is now acute. Two of the world's contested waterways are impaired at once, for unrelated reasons.

Watch next: The signals that matter now: whether Trump's 20% Hormuz toll moves from declaration toward any executive order or collection mechanism; confirmation or denial of Iranian permit/fee enforcement; whether Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia (Abha, the first since the 2022 truce) shift from airports to oil facilities — the spare-capacity buffer holding the price; the pace of Ukrainian Azov strikes and any Russian reopening of the Kerch Strait; and further insurer/JWC action (a possible JWLA-034 circular) confirming a fresh hardening.

Premium ranges aggregated from publicly-cited figures in news sources; exact rates are confidential between brokers and underwriters. JWC Listed Areas from Lloyd's Joint War Committee circular JWLA-033 (3 March 2026). Editorial reading is our market interpretation, not a republished source. Updated 14 Jul 2026.

Current Route Status — 29 August 2026

Status reflects current editorial assessment based on publicly available information. Risk levels: Normal · Elevated · High · Critical

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Seismic Signals — M5.0+ Past 7 Days

Source: USGS →

M5.0+ earthquakes near oil infrastructure regions: Middle East & Gulf, North Africa, Caspian, Caucasus, North Sea, Southern Europe. Shallow quakes (<70km) near refineries or pipelines carry highest operational risk.

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Thermal Anomalies — Major Refineries & Terminals

No thermal anomalies detected near tracked 24 major EU and Gulf refineries / terminals in the past 24 hours.

NASA FIRMS VIIRS satellite detections within ~15 km of 24 major EU and Gulf refineries / terminals. Past 24 h. High Fire Radiative Power near a facility may indicate flaring, fire, or process incident — not all detections indicate incidents.

Bunker Fuel Prices

Ship & Bunker →
RotterdamARA
NW Europe
VLSFO
$584/mt
MGO
$704/mt
FujairahFUJA
Middle East
VLSFO
$599/mt
MGO
$719/mt
SingaporeSING
Asia-Pacific
VLSFO
$592/mt
MGO
$714/mt

Derived from Brent, not live market quotes. Formula: VLSFO ≈ Brent × 6.5 + 10, MGO ≈ Brent × 6.5 + 130 (basis $88.29/bbl). During supply disruptions, real physical bunker prices for prompt delivery typically run substantially higher than this — see Ship & Bunker or Bunker Index for actual market quotes. VLSFO = IMO 2020 compliant very low sulphur fuel oil. MGO = marine gas oil (ECA-grade).

Bunker Prices — Historical Trend

Estimated from Brent crude benchmark. VLSFO = IMO 2020 low-sulphur fuel oil. MGO = marine gas oil.

ARA Independent Stocks

Amsterdam–Rotterdam–Antwerp refining hub · Last refresh: week ending 15 Apr 2026

Source paused

⚠ Data source unavailable since late April 2026. Argus Media restructured its article URLs and the weekly Insights Global stocks report no longer appears in their public sitemap. Figures below are the last successful capture and are not currently being refreshed.

Gasoil / Diesel

w/w

fallen by 11pc in the past two weeks to an eight-month low

Jet Fuel

600 kt

-7.6%w/w

lowest level since April 2020, a six-year low

Gasoline

1.04 Mt

+2.5%w/w

Naphtha

430 kt

-13.9%w/w

lowest level in a year

Fuel Oil

Not reported this week

Independently-held inventories at the ARA hub — the single most-watched European refined-product signal for traders. Historical source: Insights Global (publisher) syndicated via Argus Media (free feed). · Last source article →

Active Disruption Risk

Strait of Hormuz

Persian Gulf / Gulf of Oman

Critical — tanker tonnage at 1% of the 2023 norm (live · IMF PortWatch)Indirect / price impact

Daily flow

~20 mb/d

Location

Between Iran and Oman, connecting Persian Gulf to Arabian Sea

The Strait of Hormuz remains the master variable for global oil. After the conflict that began in late February 2026 effectively closed it, the EIA assumed Hormuz stayed shut into late May, with traffic only beginning to pick up in June. Iran now says the strait will reopen only under new conditions — including possible transit fees set with Oman — which Washington opposes and Oman has reportedly declined to support. Iran describes the strait as open, but in practice only a handful of crude, product and LNG vessels have exited recently — often with AIS gaps or under heightened risk — while overall Gulf flows stay far below normal. Open on paper, restricted in practice.

EU Impact

Approximately 20% of global seaborne oil and LNG — around 20 mb/d of oil — normally transits Hormuz. The IEA put Gulf output affected by the closure around 14.4 mb/d below pre-war levels, with total supply losses since February of roughly 12.8 mb/d, which it has called the largest disruption on record. Atlantic Basin crude premiums stay elevated as Asian buyers compete for non-Gulf supply, putting direct upward pressure on EU feedstock costs. Crucially, Middle East jet-fuel arrivals into Europe fell from about 330,000 to 60,000 b/d between March and April (IEA) — diesel and jet are where the squeeze reaches EU industry and aviation first.

Hormuz is Washington's top priority and Tehran's main leverage in unresolved US–Iran talks, alongside sanctions, frozen funds and nuclear limits. The early-June Israeli strike on Iran's Mahshahr petrochemical complex — the first hit on Iranian energy infrastructure since the April ceasefire — put a direct energy-asset risk premium back on top of the chokepoint risk. Even after a reopening, recovery is slow: Kuwait says it could restore about 70% of output within 6–8 weeks, the rest taking roughly another month. The Red Sea/Suez route remains independently disrupted by Houthi attacks.

Suez Canal

Egypt — Red Sea to Mediterranean

High — tanker tonnage down to 47% of the 2023 norm (live · IMF PortWatch)Moderate EU impact

Daily flow

~5.5 mb/d

Location

Northeast Egypt, connecting Red Sea (via Gulf of Suez) to Mediterranean

The Suez Canal carries around 5.5 mb/d of oil and petroleum products plus significant LNG volumes. Red Sea avoidance by commercial tankers has kept Canal transit volumes far below pre-disruption levels since late 2023. Cape of Good Hope diversion remains the operating norm for Gulf-to-Europe cargoes. With Hormuz still constrained, both primary Gulf-to-Europe export corridors remain under simultaneous pressure.

EU Impact

Cape routing adds 10–14 days and substantial cost to Middle Eastern cargo journeys, inflating EU import costs. EU refiners in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean with limited domestic alternatives continue to face higher feedstock costs. The constrained Hormuz corridor compounds the Red Sea disruption — a full recovery in EU supply chains now requires resolution of both.

The Sumed pipeline can carry approximately 2.5 mb/d of crude as a bypass but not refined products. EU member states have largely adapted sourcing to Atlantic Basin suppliers, but at sustained higher cost. A Houthi ceasefire remains the necessary condition for Red Sea/Suez recovery.

Bab-el-Mandeb Strait

Yemen / Djibouti — Red Sea entrance

Critical — MARAD 2026-006: Houthi Attacks on Commercial VesselsModerate EU impact

Daily flow

~4.5 mb/d

Location

Between Yemen and Djibouti/Eritrea, connecting Gulf of Aden to Red Sea

The southern entrance to the Red Sea remains actively disrupted by Houthi attacks since November 2023. Around 4.5 mb/d of oil and products normally transits this route; daily traffic through Bab-el-Mandeb and Suez Canal remains far below pre-attack levels. With Hormuz also still constrained, both primary Gulf export corridors remain under simultaneous pressure.

EU Impact

ARA-bound cargoes from the Middle East continue to route via the Cape of Good Hope, adding 30+ days versus the Red Sea route. Eastern European states with fewer domestic supply alternatives and countries dependent on Middle Eastern diesel remain most acutely affected. With Hormuz constrained at the same time, both disruptions overlapping represent the most severe supply-corridor constraint since the 1973 oil embargo.

Operation Prosperity Guardian has not restored commercial transit confidence. Insurance premiums for Red Sea passage remain prohibitive. The Houthi threat is geopolitically linked to the broader US-Iran-Israel conflict; renewed Houthi threats in the Red Sea are an active watch-item alongside the constrained Hormuz corridor. Red Sea normalisation requires a separate Houthi ceasefire.

Reviewed 29 Aug 2026

South China Sea — Scarborough Shoal

West Philippines Sea / South China Sea

High — active gray-zone coercion; no declared blockadeIndirect / price impact

Daily flow

~3.4 mb/d

Location

Scarborough Shoal, approximately 220km west of the Philippines, within the broader South China Sea corridor

An active gray-zone flashpoint. Chinese control at Scarborough Shoal is being exercised through coast guard presence, episodic barriers, water-cannon and blocking operations, administrative measures and joint drills — not through a declared blockade. Satellite analysis in April showed ships and a floating barrier tightening control of the shoal's entrance; a floating platform seen around late May was subsequently removed, so no permanent structure should be described as established. On 23 and 24 July, Philippine government vessels were subjected to Chinese Coast Guard water cannon on consecutive days; on 1 August, Chinese military and coast guard forces conducted joint air and naval combat drills around the shoal. The wider sea lane carries approximately 3.4 mb/d of oil — primarily Middle Eastern crude transiting to China, Japan and South Korea — along with significant LNG volumes.

EU Impact

The South China Sea does not sit on the primary EU supply route, but its disruption feeds into European fuel markets through displaced demand. If Chinese and East Asian buyers are unable to secure normal Gulf supply volumes via this corridor, they compete more aggressively for Atlantic Basin, West African, and North Sea cargoes — the same pool EU refiners draw on. With Hormuz still constrained, Gulf supply to Asia is already severely limited — a South China Sea escalation would further intensify competition for alternative supply.

Corrected 21 August 2026: earlier wording in this entry describing an established blockade has been withdrawn as unverified, aligning this entry with the network's 11 August reassessment; the 16 April state is superseded. Two boundaries are held deliberately. First, the systemic trigger is NOT met: there is no declared blockade or quarantine and no verified armed exchange of fire at Scarborough, so the observed state is coercion below that threshold. Second, the legal position needs care: sovereignty over the shoal has not been adjudicated — the 2016 arbitration did not award territorial sovereignty to the Philippines; it rejected key Chinese maritime claims and found China's blockade of traditional fishing access unlawful, and Beijing rejects the award. The stand-off has drawn US statements under the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines. Rechecked 21 August 2026: no new incident at the shoal has been verified since the 1 August joint drills. A full closure of the broader South China Sea to commercial traffic — not the current situation — would rank among the most severe supply shocks in modern history, which is why the distinction between coercion and a declared closure is worth maintaining precisely. Next review: any verified blockade or quarantine declaration, exchange of fire, or interference with commercial tanker traffic in the wider corridor.

Elevated — Worth Monitoring

Danish Straits

Denmark / Sweden — Baltic Sea access

Elevated — open and functioning; enforcement and navigation-safety risk risingModerate EU impact

Daily flow

~3 mb/d

Location

Between Denmark and Sweden, connecting Baltic Sea to North Sea

The Danish Straits (Øresund, Great Belt, Little Belt) are the only maritime access to the Baltic Sea. Around 3 mb/d of Russian oil exports — primarily crude and oil products from Baltic ports (Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Kaliningrad) — transited this route before Western sanctions. Post-sanctions, the mix has shifted but Baltic tanker traffic remains significant, and shadow-fleet transits continue at roughly 175 tankers a month.

EU Impact

Russian crude previously supplied a significant share of EU refinery inputs via Baltic ports, particularly for refineries in Poland, Germany, Finland, and the Baltic states. Post-sanctions diversification has been largely achieved, but at higher cost and with some residual dependence on Russian pipeline crude under temporary exemptions. NATO sensitivity around Baltic infrastructure is heightened following submarine cable incidents.

Re-baselined 21 August 2026, aligning this entry with the network's 11 August reassessment; the previous "normal — monitoring" state (last reviewed 8 April) is superseded. There is no verified closure, general transit ban, or material route-throughput disruption attributable to Danish action — the route is open and functioning. What has changed is the enforcement and safety environment around it. Danish Maritime Authority sanctions material, updated through 24 July 2026, applies extensive restrictions to EU-designated vessels: they are generally barred from EU ports, anchorage zones and locks, and from services including insurance, bunkering, crew changes, cargo handling and tug services — provisions framed around ports, services and designated vessels rather than a blanket prohibition on passage, with pilotage still suppliable for safety reasons. The legal position is frequently overstated: Denmark's UNCLOS declaration invokes Article 35(c) for the special regime governing the Great Belt, Little Belt and the Danish part of the Sound, developed from the 1857 Copenhagen Treaty, so any claim that Denmark could simply close the Straits to a whole class of foreign shipping needs far more legal qualification than ordinary sanctions enforcement. Rechecked 21 August 2026: enforcement is still tightening — Denmark has announced strengthened environmental oversight of tankers at the Skagen anchorage, funded in the 2026 finance act, with environmental ship inspectors joining port-state-control boardings, plus sulphur-"sniffer" monitoring on the Great Belt Bridge through year-end. Mid-August reports of a Russian frigate deployment near Fehmarn remain single-source and are not carried here as established. Direction: risk rising; the chokepoint has not triggered — a Danish closure remains a scenario, not an observed state. Next review: any Danish detention or refusal action against a transiting tanker, a further DMA sanctions update, or a verified naval incident in or near the Straits.

Turkish Straits

Turkey — Black Sea to Mediterranean

Elevated — tanker tonnage at 73% of the 2023 norm (live · IMF PortWatch)Moderate EU impact

Daily flow

~2.4 mb/d

Location

Bosphorus and Dardanelles, connecting Black Sea to Aegean Sea

The Bosphorus and Dardanelles control Black Sea access to the Mediterranean. Around 2.4 mb/d passes through — primarily Kazakhstani crude via the CPC pipeline and residual Russian Black Sea exports. Turkey has periodically restricted passage, citing insurance requirements linked to Western price cap enforcement on Russian oil.

EU Impact

Kazakhstani crude via the CPC pipeline is an important non-Russian supply source for some Southern European refineries. Periodic delays at the Turkish Straits have tightened Mediterranean crude markets and affected Adriatic and Aegean refinery feedstocks. EU refiners with Mediterranean exposure monitor this route closely. Greek and Italian refiners are most directly affected by transit disruptions.

Turkey operates transit rights under the 1936 Montreux Convention. The EU price cap on Russian oil has created ongoing legal and commercial friction around insurance requirements for vessels. Turkey has resisted pressure to fully enforce EU-aligned restrictions, creating a persistent compliance gap.

Reviewed 23 Aug 2026

Normal Conditions

ARA Hub

Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp, Northwest Europe

Normal — functioningDirect EU impact

Daily flow

~4 mb/d

Location

Northwest European coast — Netherlands and Belgium

The Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) complex is Europe's largest refining and oil storage hub, handling around 4 mb/d of crude and products. It acts as the primary pricing and distribution point for Northwest European fuel markets. Rotterdam alone is the world's largest port by cargo volume. Note: shipping around Antwerp was partially halted on 10 April 2026 following an oil spill; this is an operational incident under containment rather than a structural supply route disruption.

EU Impact

ARA is the clearing hub for European diesel, petrol, and jet fuel. Prices at ARA set the reference for fuel costs across Northwest Europe and influence prices as far east as Poland and the Baltic states. The constrained Hormuz corridor sustains Atlantic Basin tightness as Gulf crude supply remains limited and Asian buyers compete for the same alternative supply pool as EU refiners. Red Sea disruption continues to inflate freight costs for Middle Eastern cargoes, and reduced Middle East jet-fuel arrivals into Europe keep distillate balances tight. The Antwerp spill incident (10 April) is an operational matter under containment.

ARA commercial storage acts as a buffer for European supply disruptions. Tanker arrivals at Rotterdam are a leading indicator of fuel availability. ARA stock levels are published weekly by Insights Global and monitored closely by energy traders. In the current environment, ARA stock drawdown is the key metric to watch for early signs of downstream tightness.

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Live Tanker Map — European Waters

LIVE

Real-time AIS positions across the North Sea, Mediterranean, Baltic, and Suez approaches

About this page

This page provides an editorial assessment of key oil supply routes and their current status. Flow volumes are approximate figures from IEA and EIA public data. Risk assessments reflect publicly available information and are updated periodically — this is not a live or automated feed.

For authoritative data, see the EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints and the IEA.

For UK-specific fuel reserve data, see UKOilWatch →