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Global Oil Supply Routes

Status of the key maritime chokepoints and supply routes that affect European fuel security. Updated editorially β€” not a live tracker.

Current Route Status β€” 10 April 2026

Status reflects current editorial assessment based on publicly available information. Risk levels: Normal Β· Elevated Β· High Β· Critical

Active Disruption Risk

Strait of Hormuz

Persian Gulf / Gulf of Oman

Critical β€” near-standstill trafficIndirect / price impact

Daily flow

~20 mb/d

Location

Between Iran and Oman, connecting Persian Gulf to Arabian Sea

The world's most critical oil chokepoint is in active disruption. Traffic has fallen to a small fraction of normal levels, with only a handful of vessels transiting and major operators suspending Gulf loadings. Iran is effectively controlling passage conditions. The ~20 mb/d that normally flows through the strait β€” around 20% of global oil trade β€” is severely constrained.

EU Impact

The global price shock from Hormuz disruption is actively under way. Asian buyers displaced from Gulf supply are competing directly with EU refiners for Atlantic Basin, North Sea, and West African barrels, driving record crude premiums. EU refiners dependent on Middle Eastern feedstocks face immediate cost increases. The disruption is compounding the existing Red Sea crisis, simultaneously closing the two routes that carry the majority of EU-bound crude from the Gulf.

Bypass routes no longer provide meaningful relief. Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline capacity has been reduced by attacks on Saudi output; the UAE's ADCO pipeline cannot absorb displaced volumes at scale. IEA coordinated strategic reserve releases are under active consideration. The disruption is geopolitically linked to the Houthi/Red Sea crisis β€” both stem from the same regional conflict, creating a compound supply shock.

Bab-el-Mandeb Strait

Yemen / Djibouti β€” Red Sea entrance

High β€” active Houthi threatModerate EU impact

Daily flow

~4.5 mb/d

Location

Between Yemen and Djibouti/Eritrea, connecting Gulf of Aden to Red Sea

The southern entrance to the Red Sea remains actively disrupted by Houthi attacks since November 2023. Around 4.5 mb/d of oil and products normally transits this route; daily traffic through Bab-el-Mandeb and Suez Canal remains far below pre-attack levels. This disruption now forms part of a wider compound crisis alongside the Hormuz near-standstill β€” both geopolitically linked.

EU Impact

ARA-bound cargoes from the Middle East continue to route via the Cape of Good Hope, adding 30+ days versus the Red Sea route. The simultaneous Hormuz disruption has compounded the effect: two of the three most important tanker corridors for EU crude and product supply are now simultaneously impaired. Eastern European states with fewer domestic supply alternatives and countries dependent on Middle Eastern diesel are most acutely affected.

Operation Prosperity Guardian has not restored commercial transit confidence. Insurance premiums for Red Sea passage remain prohibitive. The Houthi threat and Hormuz disruption share geopolitical roots in the same regional conflict, making a coordinated resolution difficult. Compound supply shocks of this kind are unprecedented in the post-2000 era.

Elevated β€” Worth Monitoring

Suez Canal

Egypt β€” Red Sea to Mediterranean

Elevated β€” Red Sea rerouting ongoingModerate EU impact

Daily flow

~5.5 mb/d

Location

Northeast Egypt, connecting Red Sea (via Gulf of Suez) to Mediterranean

The Suez Canal carries around 5.5 mb/d of oil and petroleum products plus significant LNG volumes. Red Sea avoidance by commercial tankers has kept Canal transit volumes far below pre-disruption levels since late 2023. Cape of Good Hope diversion is now the operating norm for Gulf-to-Europe cargoes, and simultaneous Hormuz disruption has compounded the pressure on European supply chains.

EU Impact

Europe's exposure is now acute: Cape routing adds 10–14 days and substantial cost to Middle Eastern cargo journeys, while Hormuz disruption has simultaneously constrained the volume of Gulf crude and products available for export. EU refiners in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean with limited domestic alternatives are facing the sharpest margin and availability pressure. The compound effect of these two simultaneous disruptions is unlike any previous supply shock.

The Sumed pipeline can carry approximately 2.5 mb/d of crude as a bypass but not refined products. EU member states have largely adapted sourcing to Atlantic Basin suppliers, but at sustained higher cost. A Houthi ceasefire is the necessary condition for Red Sea/Suez recovery; Hormuz normalisation requires a separate political resolution.

Normal Conditions

Danish Straits

Denmark / Sweden β€” Baltic Sea access

Normal β€” monitoring Baltic activityModerate EU impact

Daily flow

~3 mb/d

Location

Between Denmark and Sweden, connecting Baltic Sea to North Sea

The only maritime access to the Baltic Sea. Pre-sanctions, around 3 mb/d of Russian crude and products from Baltic ports (Primorsk, Ust-Luga) transited this route. Post-2022 sanctions have reduced Russian flows but shadow fleet tankers continue to carry Russian oil, raising insurance and environmental concerns.

EU Impact

Russian crude previously supplied a significant share of EU refinery inputs via Baltic ports, particularly for refineries in Poland, Germany, Finland, and the Baltic states. Post-sanctions diversification has been largely achieved, but at higher cost and with some residual dependence on Russian pipeline crude under temporary exemptions. NATO sensitivity around Baltic infrastructure is heightened following submarine cable incidents.

Denmark and Sweden are both NATO members and have shown willingness to scrutinise shadow fleet tanker transits. The EU has progressively tightened enforcement of price cap rules on Russian oil transiting these waters. Several shadow fleet vessels have been detained or refused port access in the region.

Turkish Straits

Turkey β€” Black Sea to Mediterranean

Normal β€” price cap compliance tensionModerate EU impact

Daily flow

~2.4 mb/d

Location

Bosphorus and Dardanelles, connecting Black Sea to Aegean Sea

The Bosphorus and Dardanelles control Black Sea access to the Mediterranean. Around 2.4 mb/d passes through β€” primarily Kazakhstani crude via the CPC pipeline and residual Russian Black Sea exports. Turkey has periodically restricted passage, citing insurance requirements linked to Western price cap enforcement on Russian oil.

EU Impact

Kazakhstani crude via the CPC pipeline is an important non-Russian supply source for some Southern European refineries. Periodic delays at the Turkish Straits have tightened Mediterranean crude markets and affected Adriatic and Aegean refinery feedstocks. EU refiners with Mediterranean exposure monitor this route closely. Greek and Italian refiners are most directly affected by transit disruptions.

Turkey operates transit rights under the 1936 Montreux Convention. The EU price cap on Russian oil has created ongoing legal and commercial friction around insurance requirements for vessels. Turkey has resisted pressure to fully enforce EU-aligned restrictions, creating a persistent compliance gap.

ARA Hub

Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp, Northwest Europe

Normal β€” functioningDirect EU impact

Daily flow

~4 mb/d

Location

Northwest European coast β€” Netherlands and Belgium

The Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) complex is Europe's largest refining and oil storage hub, handling around 4 mb/d of crude and products. It acts as the primary pricing and distribution point for Northwest European fuel markets. Rotterdam alone is the world's largest port by cargo volume. Note: shipping around Antwerp was partially halted on 10 April 2026 following an oil spill; this is an operational incident under containment rather than a structural supply route disruption.

EU Impact

ARA is the clearing hub for European diesel, petrol, and jet fuel. Prices at ARA set the reference for fuel costs across Northwest Europe and influence prices as far east as Poland and the Baltic states. Reduced tanker arrivals at ARA β€” a likely consequence of both Hormuz and Red Sea disruptions tightening Atlantic Basin cargo availability β€” typically precede price rises within 2–3 weeks. The Antwerp spill incident (10 April) may cause short-term delays; the structural supply picture depends on incoming cargo volumes.

ARA commercial storage acts as a buffer for European supply disruptions. Tanker arrivals at Rotterdam are a leading indicator of fuel availability. ARA stock levels are published weekly by Insights Global and monitored closely by energy traders. In the current environment, ARA stock drawdown is the key metric to watch for early signs of downstream tightness.

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Live Tanker Map β€” European Waters

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Real-time AIS positions across the North Sea, Mediterranean, Baltic, and Suez approaches

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About this page

This page provides an editorial assessment of key oil supply routes and their current status. Flow volumes are approximate figures from IEA and EIA public data. Risk assessments reflect publicly available information and are updated periodically β€” this is not a live or automated feed.

For authoritative data, see the EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints and the IEA.

For UK-specific fuel reserve data, see UKOilWatch β†’